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PREVENTING TRAFFICKING THROUGH NEW 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OVER LABOR 
MIGRATION 
Janie A. Chuang* 
 
The year 2020 marks the twentieth anniversary of the United 
Nations (U.N.) Trafficking Protocol—a treaty that established the 
foundation for global efforts to address the problem of human 
trafficking.1 That treaty offered an early framing of the problem as a 
transnational crime, best addressed through aggressive prosecution of 
traffickers and international cooperation to that end.2 Since the 
Protocol’s adoption, global antitrafficking law and policy have 
evolved significantly. The once near-exclusive focus on the 
prosecution prong of the treaty’s “3Ps” approach to 
trafficking— focused on prosecuting trafficking, protecting trafficked 
persons, and preventing trafficking—has given way to an increased 
emphasis on victim protection.3 Prevention, however, remains the 3Ps’ 
most neglected prong. Prevention efforts have narrowly focused on 
public awareness campaigns to warn vulnerable populations, as well 
                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. Thanks to the Georgia State 
University Law Review for including me in this Symposium on “Prioritizing Prevention in Human 
Trafficking: Research, Innovation, and Advocacy.” I am grateful for the insights and feedback on the 
ideas presented in this Article that I received from Tendayi Achiume, Daniel Costa, Cathryn Costello, 
Heather Hughes, Daniela Kraiem, Loren Landau, Genevieve LeBaron, Neha Misra, Fernanda Nicola, 
Ashley Parrish, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Ezra Rosser, and participants of the Berkeley Law Migration 
Workshop, the Oxford University Workshop on IOM, and the Expert Working Group for the Study of 
Slavery at the Yale Gilder-Lehrman Center. Thanks also to Melissa Martin, Madeline Creps, and Krishna 
Pathak for their excellent research assistance, and the GSU Law Review editors for their patience and 
careful review of drafts of this Article. 
 1. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 3, opened for 
signature Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319. 
 2. Id. at arts. 2, 4. 
 3. Id. at arts. 5 (prosecution), 6–8 (protection), 9–11 (prevention); 3Ps: Prosecution, Protection, and 
Prevention, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/3ps-prosecution-protection-and-prevention/ 
[https://perma.cc/6ST5-SGQS] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
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as potential consumers of trafficked goods and services, of the risks 
and many manifestations of human trafficking.4 
We have reached a critical inflection point in our understanding of 
the trafficking phenomenon and how best to address it. With too few 
traffickers prosecuted and too few victims protected, more robust 
efforts to prevent trafficking are clearly necessary. In 2018, 
governments around the world identified a total of 85,613 victims, 
brought 11,096 prosecutions, and obtained 7,481 convictions.5 
Considering the claim that purportedly 40.3 million people are in 
“modern slavery” worldwide,6 prosecution and post-hoc protection 
strategies have hardly made a dent in the problem.7 That is particularly 
so for nonsexual labor trafficking, which despite constituting 80% of 
forced labor/trafficking cases worldwide,8 accounted for only 4% of 
prosecutions, 3% of convictions, and 13% of victims identified by 
global law enforcement authorities in 2018.9 
Efforts by advocates to draw attention to nonsexual labor trafficking 
have underscored how trafficking is not simply the product of deviant, 
criminal behavior that once rooted out can easily be eliminated. Also 
to blame are deeply embedded societal structures that facilitate and 
even reward exploitation—in particular, weak labor and migration 
frameworks that perpetuate precarity for migrant workers in their 
search for economic opportunities. Because worker exploitation and 
trafficking differ in degree, not in kind,10 addressing migrant worker 
                                                                                                             
 4. Id. 
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 38 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 U.S. TIP 
REPORT]. 
 6. Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, at 9 (2017), 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/ 
wcms_575479.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H3V-ZG4P] [hereinafter 2017 GEMS]. 
 7. 2019 U.S. TIP REPORT, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 8. 2017 GEMS, supra note 6, at 10. The estimated 40.3 million people in “modern slavery” include 
15.4 million people living in forced marriage and 24.9 million in forced labor. Id. at 9. Of those in forced 
labor, 20.1 million were in nonsexual forced labor, while 4.8 million were in “forced sexual exploitation.” 
Id. at 10. 
 9. 2019 U.S. TIP REPORT, supra note 5. The statistics cited in the text accompanying note 5 include 
a breakout of the total prosecutions, convictions, and victims identified in cases involving nonsexual labor 
trafficking in 2018: 11,096 (457) prosecutions; 7,481 (259) convictions; 85,613 (11,009) victims 
identified. Id. 
 10. Hila Shamir, A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 76, 110 (2012). 
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exploitation more broadly can prevent the abuses from escalating into 
trafficking.11   
Recent developments in the international migration field present an 
opportunity to address structural contributors to trafficking by 
establishing norms and institutions to foster safe labor migration. In 
2015, large-scale mixed movements of refugees and migrants 
prompted the U.N. General Assembly to recognize the need for closer 
cooperation and greater responsibility-sharing and action to address 
the phenomenon.12 This ultimately resulted in the U.N. General 
Assembly adopting, in December 2018, two global compacts: a Global 
Compact on Refugees (Refugee Compact)13 and a Global Compact for 
Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM).14 While the Refugee 
Compact builds upon an established regime of laws, policies, and 
institutions, the GCM signifies a long overdue first attempt by the 
international community to develop a framework for pursuing a shared 
vision of safe and orderly global migration.15  
Unlike refugees, migrant workers are the focus of only a handful of 
international treaties.16 These treaties suffer from notoriously low 
ratification rates, and the few States that have ratified them are 
primarily countries of origin—rather than the destination countries 
where migrant workers are in the most immediate need of worker 
protections.17 Moreover, no international institution exists to facilitate 
                                                                                                             
 11. Id. 
 12. G.A. Res. 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Sept. 19, 2016) [hereinafter 
New York Declaration]. 
 13. G.A. Res. 73/151, Global Compact on Refugees (Dec. 17, 2018). 
 14. G.A. Res. 73/195, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (Dec. 19, 2018) 
[hereinafter GCM]. 
 15. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 15. 
 16. Mariette Grange, Int’l Catholic Migration Comm’n, Strengthening Protection of Migrant Workers 
and their Families with International Human Rights Treaties, at 13 (Mar. 2006), 
https://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Strengthening_protection_of_migrant_workers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/333Y-M55Q].  
 17.  For example, only fifty-five countries have ratified the U.N. Migrant Workers Convention, most 
of which are countries in Africa and Central and South America. Status of Ratification Interactive 
Dashboard, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., https://indicators.ohchr.org 
[https://perma.cc/BS9B-TH7E] (from the dropdown menu, select “International Convention on the 
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global efforts to address labor migration, unlike institutions for just 
about every other issue of significant global concern—for example, 
the World Trade Organization (trade), the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (intellectual property), and the Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (refugees), among others.  
At long last, the GCM seeks to begin filling these normative and 
institutional gaps—suggesting the possibility of new global 
governance over migration. In addition to establishing a set of 
objectives for safe, orderly, and regular migration, the GCM assigns 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to the role of 
secretariat and coordinator for U.N. efforts to assist States with GCM 
implementation.18 The GCM, in effect, affirms the IOM’s status as 
lead global migration agency, a role the IOM first quietly assumed in 
2016 when it became a “related organization” of the United Nations 
after decades operating on the periphery of the international system.19 
This Article offers initial thoughts on the possible impacts the GCM 
might have on global efforts to prevent and address trafficking, 
focusing on the newly elevated role of the IOM in this endeavor. Based 
on arguments I have made elsewhere,20 my analysis takes as a given 
that a normative, rights-based approach to migrant work is necessary 
to prevent migrant worker exploitation and abuse from escalating into 
trafficking. From that perspective, the Article explores the possibility 
that, in advising States on GCM implementation, the IOM could take 
a more proactive role in advancing workers’ rights in furtherance of 
the longer-term goal of preventing trafficking. 
Part I assesses the GCM’s potential for advancing the rights of 
migrant workers. The GCM reflects the three competing interests that 
typically animate migration policy: (1) concerns over border security, 
(2) the desire to derive labor market benefits from economic migration, 
                                                                                                             
 18. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 17. 
 19. G.A. Res. 70/296, Agreement Concerning the Relationship Between the United Nations and the 
International Organization for Migration (July 25, 2016) [hereinafter UN-IOM Agreement]. 
 20.  Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 609 (2014); Janie A. Chuang, Using Global Migration Law to Prevent Human Trafficking, 111 
AJIL UNBOUND 147 (2017). 
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and (3) the imperative to protect migrants’ rights.21 Whether and to 
what extent migrant workers are sufficiently protected against 
exploitation will turn on how States balance these competing concerns. 
Empowered to guide States in their efforts to implement the GCM, the 
IOM will play a crucial role in helping to translate GCM norms into 
State practice. Part II analyzes the IOM’s operational history and 
structure for insights into how the IOM might balance the GCM’s 
competing concerns in its efforts to advise States on GCM 
implementation. The IOM’s checkered history and its unique status as 
a non-normative, U.N.-related organization show a tendency to 
prioritize States’ concerns over border security and labor market 
access above those regarding migrant welfare.  
In contrast, the IOM’s recent efforts to promote ethical recruitment 
standards suggest the possibility of IOM assuming a more proactive 
stance towards migrant workers’ rights protections going forward. 
Part III explores these efforts, situating them within broader 
development debates over whether and to what extent rights tradeoffs 
are necessary—or acceptable—to maximize the development gains 
from migration. In advising States on GCM implementation, how IOM 
responds to pressures to trade rights for labor market access will surely 
test IOM’s professed commitment to ethical recruitment frameworks. 
Its response could prove to be a bellwether of IOM’s broader approach 
to balancing migrant worker welfare interests against the GCM’s other 
competing interests in border security and labor market access. In this 
environment, close scrutiny and strong advocacy by rights advocates 
will be necessary to fully realize the GCM’s—and the 
IOM’s—potential to advance migrant workers’ rights and prevent 
trafficking. 
I.   The GCM and Labor Migration Norm Development 
The latest available estimates indicate that in 2017 there were 258 
million international migrants globally (i.e., 3.4% of the world’s 
                                                                                                             
 21. See generally GCM, supra note 14 (adopting a global compact to address the challenges and 
benefits of migration). 
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population), of which 164 million were migrant workers.22 In 2018, 
migrants remitted approximately $689 billion worldwide, of which 
$529 billion was sent to developing countries—over four times the 
amount of official development assistance.23 With remittances 
accounting for as much as 40% of a country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP),24 it is hardly surprising that out-migration for labor has become 
a de facto development policy.25 Not only do struggling economies 
benefit from the revenues derived from remittances, but there is also 
the added benefit of reduced local unemployment rates. At the same 
time, favored destination countries have come to rely heavily on 
migrant labor—particularly to fill the so-called 3D (dirty, dangerous, 
and difficult) jobs that local workers find less desirable.26 
Despite their significant contributions to these economies, however, 
migrant workers worldwide suffer from a lack of meaningful labor 
protections. The absence of international labor recruitment regulations 
has enabled a rapidly growing private labor recruitment industry to 
enjoy impunity for a wide range of abusive practices (for example, 
exorbitant recruitment fees and contract switching).27 In most 
destination countries, migrant workers enjoy limited labor protections, 
and, as a result, employers can exert inordinate control over whether 
and under what conditions migrant workers labor. For example, under 
most temporary guestworker programs around the world, migrant 
workers’ visas are tied to specific employers—meaning that when a 
worker leaves the employment, even as a result of abusive treatment, 
                                                                                                             
 22.  Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers: Results and 
Methodology, at 5 (2018). 
 23. Remittances Data, KNOMAD, www.knomad.org/data/remittances [https://perma.cc/FYL9-
SCBY] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).  
 24. Id. For example, KNOMAD reports the following amounts of remittances as a percentage of GDP 
for 2018: Tonga (40.7%), South Sudan (35.3%), Kyrgyz Republic (33.2%), Haiti (30.9%), Tajikistan 
(29%), Nepal (28%), El Salvador (20.7%). Id.  
 25. Kimberly Beaton et al., Migration and Remittances in Latin American and the Caribbean: Engines 
of Growth and Macroeconomic Stabilizers? 2 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 17/144, 2017), 
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/WP/2017/wp17144.ashx [https://perma.cc/W93Y-
9LSF].  
 26. Id.  
 27. The GCM devotes an objective to addressing these issues. See GCM supra note 14, ¶ 22. 
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the worker’s visa is immediately rendered invalid.28 The threat of 
retaliatory termination of employment or deportation can compel 
migrant workers to endure abusive working conditions in silence. 
These structural features of cross-border labor migration can thus 
enable, if not encourage, exploitation of migrant workers that can all 
too readily reach trafficking or “modern-day slavery” extremes. 
The glaring lack of norms and institutions pertaining to labor 
migration reflects a long-standing and deeply rooted bias against 
“economic migrants” in the international system. With border control 
aptly described as “the last bastion of sovereignty,”29 States have been 
deeply reluctant to commit to legal obligations towards nonnationals 
within their territories.30 As Professor Tendayi Achiume states, 
“nonnationals are definitionally ‘political strangers’ with no 
cognizable claims to shaping the trajectory of the respective 
nation-state.”31 Sovereignty entails, after all, a nation-state’s ability to 
define its political community, and hence the terms of admission and 
inclusion concerning nonnationals.32 The singular exception to this 
broad privilege to exclude is the obligation that most States have 
accepted—under the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its Protocol33—concerning refugees or those whose 
migration is compelled by fear of certain forms of persecution by their 
home governments.34 Economic migrants, on the other hand—whose 
migration is viewed far less sympathetically (as motivated primarily 
by the desire for a better life)—have no claim to States’ beneficence 
unless they are deemed trafficked.35 And even then, trafficked persons’ 
claims to the destination country’s protections typically are contingent 
                                                                                                             
 28. DANIEL COSTA & PHILIP MARTIN, TEMPORARY LABOR MIGRATION PROGRAMS, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. 2 (2018), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/152373.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR3W-MPN3].   
 29. CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION MEANS FOR 
MIGRATION AND LAW 2 (2009). 
 30. Id. 
 31. E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1515 (2019) 
(emphasis added). 
 32. Id. at 1523–24. 
 33. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259 (entered into force 
Apr. 22, 1954). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (discussing factors that qualify an individual for refugee status, notably excluding economic 
disadvantage).  
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on their cooperation with efforts to pursue their traffickers—unlike 
refugees, whose status as refugees alone triggers State protections. 
States’ adherence to a fundamental distinction between refugees and 
economic migrants accounts for why the existing normative and 
institutional architecture of global migration governance focuses 
almost exclusively on refugee populations. 
Merely a decade ago, economic migration was viewed as best 
addressed at the regional level and through bilateral arrangements. 
Engagement at the international level was limited to a series of global 
dialogues and consultative processes—such as the U.N. High-Level 
Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the Global 
Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD).36 These fora enabled 
States and other stakeholders to develop “a better common 
understanding of contested aspects of migration that are at the centre 
of [international] debates, buil[d] trust between participating Member 
States[,] and develop[] ideas and data . . . .”37 These dialogues and 
consultative processes fostered greater confidence and willingness to 
engage in multilateral action. That foundation combined with the need 
to address large-scale movements of people over the last five 
years—for example, from or through the Middle East and North Africa 
to Europe, Central America to the United States, and Bangladesh and 
Myanmar to other Southeast Asian countries—incentivized the 
international community to finally treat economic migration as an 
issue of urgent international concern.38 After all, large-scale 
movements can have significant and widespread political, economic, 
social, developmental, humanitarian, and human rights ramifications 
across borders. A global approach is necessary to prevent and address 
the negative repercussions—particularly for developing countries, 
which tend to be disproportionately affected and already severely 
                                                                                                             
 36. Background, GLOBAL F. MIGRATION & DEV., https://www.gfmd.org/process/background 
[https://perma.cc/B5AG-4QYN] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
 37. U.N. Secretary-General, Making Migration Work for All, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/72/643 (Dec. 12, 
2017). 
 38. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 2019, at iv, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/SER.A/438, U.N. Sale No. E.20XIII.16 (2019). 
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stretched in their efforts to maintain economic and social cohesion and 
development in face of these migrant flows.39 
The GCM was thus born of the recognition that international 
cooperation regarding economic migration is necessary to address the 
world’s migration crises.40 The GCM signifies an important turning 
point, albeit with some notable limitations. The GCM is a nonbinding 
instrument—an unfortunate but necessary concession to bring States 
to the negotiating table.41 The United States nonetheless withdrew 
from the negotiations in December 2017, and convinced others to 
follow suit, arguing that such agreements subvert governments’ ability 
to control national borders.42 The GCM explicitly affirms, however, 
“the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration 
policy and their prerogative to govern migration within their 
jurisdiction, in conformity with international law.”43  
A few notable holdouts notwithstanding, 164 governments adopted 
the GCM in December 2018.44 The GCM’s substantive terms reflect a 
compromise among the competing interests of countries of origin, 
countries of destination, and the migrants themselves.45 While the 
GCM recognizes migrants’ contributions to the communities in which 
they reside, it also seeks to address the root causes of migration to 
enable people to remain in their home countries rather than have to 
migrate for survival. Regrettably, the GCM focuses more on 
                                                                                                             
 39. New York Declaration, supra note 12, ¶ 7. 
 40. GCM, supra note 14.  
 41. Id. ¶ 7.  
 42. Olivia Beavers, US Pulls Out of Global Compact on Migration, HILL (Dec. 3, 2017, 1:38 PM) 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/363014-us-pulls-out-of-global-compact-on-migration 
[https://perma.cc/9WMV-KA29]. Austria, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Hungary, Israel, Latvia, 
Poland, and Slovakia refused to sign the pact citing concern that doing so would infringe upon their 
sovereign right to decide issues relating to migration and security. Jessica Toale, Why Have 12 Countries 
Pulled Out of the UN Migration Pact?, MEDIUM (Dec. 7, 2018), https://medium.com/@jjtoale/why-have-
12-countries-pulled-out-of-the-un-migration-pact-a48779aadf2d [https://perma.cc/Q8Q7-597U]. Many 
of these countries objected that the GCM failed to sufficiently distinguish between legal and illegal 
migration. Id. 
 43. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 15. 
 44.  General Assembly Officially Adopts Roadmap for Migrants to Improve Safety, Ease Suffering, UN 
NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018),  https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/12/1028941 [https://perma.cc/ZW9C-DAQE]. 
 45. Press Release, World Leaders Adopt First-Ever Global Compact on Migration, Outlining 
Framework to Protect Millions of Migrants, Support Countries Accommodating Them, U.N. Press 
Release DEV/3375 (Dec. 10, 2018). 
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preventing irregular and precarious migration than on creating 
additional legal migration pathways—the inclusion of which could 
help alleviate the need for migrants to rely on 
smugglers-cum-traffickers to facilitate their border crossings. 
Limitations aside, however, the GCM could nonetheless be viewed 
as progress in acknowledging and beginning to address key structural 
contributors to migrants’ vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking. 
The GCM contains a list of twenty-three objectives for safe, orderly, 
and regular migration, each accompanied by a list of actions States can 
take to realize each objective.46 The objectives are wide-ranging in 
scope, and when taken as a whole, reflect the GCM drafters’ effort to 
balance States’ concerns over border control, their access to flexible 
labor markets, and their desire to reduce migrant vulnerability to harm 
and exploitation. For example, the objectives call upon States to ensure 
migrants have proof of legal identity; to promote faster, safer, and 
cheaper transfer of remittances; and to enhance consular protection and 
assistance throughout the course of migration.47 
One of the GCM objectives specifically targets trafficking 
(Objective 10: “[p]revent, combat and eradicate trafficking”) and 
includes a list of ten suggested actions to realize that goal.48 The 
recommended actions focus on law enforcement measures designed to 
suppress negative phenomena related to trafficking. These include, for 
example, monitoring irregular migration routes and cross-border 
intelligence sharing to disrupt financial flows associated with 
trafficking. The proposed actions also feature strategies to empower 
actual and potential victims—such as awareness-raising campaigns to 
educate migrants of the risks of trafficking and improved access to 
justice for victims and those at risk of becoming victims.49 Indeed, the 
recommended actions go further than the U.N. Trafficking Protocol in 
at least two crucial respects. First, the GCM recommends that States 
“avoid criminalization of migrants who are victims of trafficking in 
                                                                                                             
 46. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 6.  
 47.  Id. ¶¶ 4, 14, 20. 
 48. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. 
 49. Id. ¶ 17.  
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persons for trafficking-related offen[s]es.”50 Second, it recommends 
that States “[e]nsure that the victim receives appropriate protection and 
assistance, not conditional upon cooperation with the authorities 
against suspected traffickers.”51 Both are guarantees that human rights 
advocates had unsuccessfully sought to have included in the U.N. 
Trafficking Protocol.52 
But perhaps even more significant for antitrafficking efforts are the 
non-trafficking-specific provisions of the GCM that, if meaningfully 
implemented, would significantly reduce vulnerability to trafficking 
by targeting structural contributors to migrant worker exploitation. 
Many migrant workers throughout the world labor under conditions 
that do not rise to the level of trafficking, yet they suffer significant 
rights violations for which meaningful access to protection and redress 
is limited, if not nonexistent. If left unchecked, such exploitation can 
readily worsen and become trafficking. Attending to the structures that 
enable these lesser abuses to occur, therefore, can reduce migrants’ 
vulnerability to exploitation, and help prevent trafficking. 
Take, for instance, GCM Objective 6, which seeks to “[f]acilitate 
fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure 
decent work.”53 Objective 6 targets abusive labor recruitment practices 
that can foster situations of debt bondage and forced labor.54 The 
suggested actions States might take to fulfill Objective 6 include, for 
example, prohibiting recruiters and employers from charging or 
shifting recruitment fees or related costs to migrant workers; allowing 
migrant workers to change employers; and ensuring migrants safe 
access to effective complaint and redress mechanisms for workplace 
violations “in a manner that does not exacerbate vulnerabilities of 
migrants who denounce such incidents.”55 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and 
Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1677 (2010); Anne Gallagher, Human Rights 
and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 975, 990–91 (2001). 
 53. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 12.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. 
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These suggested actions, if implemented, would address major 
factors that feed the exploitation and trafficking of migrant workers. 
The ability to charge recruitment fees provides unscrupulous 
employers (and recruiters) tremendous leverage to prevent migrant 
workers from leaving even extreme situations of exploitation. Many 
migrant workers cannot afford to pay the fees upfront, and often obtain 
loans—sometimes at exorbitant interest rates and with family assets 
put up as collateral—that they pledge to reimburse with their earnings. 
The penalties associated with defaulting on these loans further 
disincentivize migrant workers from complaining about workplace 
abuses, as doing so can result in retaliatory termination, retaliatory 
deportation, and blacklisting from future jobs. Moreover, if 
terminated, the worker may not be able to seek employment from a 
new employer if—as is the case for most guestworker programs 
around the world—the worker’s visa is tied to specific employers, such 
that leaving that employer immediately renders the visa invalid and the 
worker out of status.56 Taking the suggested actions for Objective 6 to 
prohibit recruitment fees, eliminate employer-tying of visas, and 
provide anti-retaliation protections, would go a long way to reducing 
migrant worker vulnerability to trafficking. 
None of these suggested actions are new recommendations. They 
encapsulate what rights advocates have long argued, with limited 
success, ought to be incorporated into laws and regulations governing 
migrant work. For example, rights advocates in the United States have 
sought laws to protect migrant workers who report labor violations 
from retaliatory deportation and termination, only to have proposed 
legislation languish in the U.S. Congress.57 U.S. rights advocates have 
also sought a prohibition on recruitment fees. While they have 
succeeded with respect to workers employed by federal contractors 
and subcontractors that provide goods and services to the U.S. 
government,58 they have made few inroads towards achieving a 
prohibition on recruitment fees for U.S. guestworker programs writ 
                                                                                                             
 56. COSTA & MARTIN, supra note 28.  
 57. See, e.g., Protect Our Workers from Exploitation and Retaliation Act, H.R. 5908, 115th Cong. 
(2018). 
 58.  See FAR 22.1703(a)(5)–(7) (2019). 
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large—in no small part due to strong objections from business 
associations. Groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have 
argued, for example, that only unreasonable (as opposed to all) 
recruitment fees should be prohibited, and in any event, that the term 
recruitment fees should be narrowly construed to exclude many of the 
fees typically charged to workers (for example, visa processing and 
transportation fees).59 On an even more discouraging trajectory, 
employer-tying remains the norm in guestworker programs in the U.S. 
and many countries abroad, particularly in Gulf States utilizing a 
kafala system.60 Israel banned employer-tying (known as “binding” 
there) in the domestic work sector in 2010, only to reinstate it a year 
later in response to strong lobbying by elderly and disabled groups 
concerned about caregiver turnover.61 In a similarly regressive move 
in 2012, the United Kingdom introduced employer-tying of visas for 
domestic workers as part of a broader effort to restrict entry of 
low-skilled migrants62—resulting in markedly increased rates of abuse 
as compared to the previous period when domestic workers were free 
to change employers.63 
                                                                                                             
 59. Note that these arguments were made in the context of prohibitions on recruitment fees in the U.S. 
government contracting context. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., Comment Letter on 
Proposed Rule of the FAR Case 2015-0017, Combating Trafficking in Persons-Definition of “Recruitment 
Fees” (81 Fed. Reg. 29244) (July 11, 2016); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., Letter on the Senior 
Policy Operating Group to Combat Trafficking in Persons Draft Definition for “Recruitment Fees” (FAR 
Case 2014-001–Ending Trafficking in Persons) (Mar. 18, 2015). Though the U.S. government ultimately 
released a broad definition of “recruitment fees,” it did so over three years after the prohibition was 
promulgated. Combating Trafficking in Persons—Definition of “Recruitment Fees,” 83 Fed. Reg. 65,466 
(Dec. 20, 2018) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 22, 52). 
 60. LAUREN A. APGAR, ECON. POLICY INST., AUTHORIZED STATUS, LIMITED RETURNS 1, 3 (2015), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/authorized-status-limited-returns-labor-market-outcomes-temporary-
mexican-workers/ [https://perma.cc/GNQ3-QUJU]; Zorana Knezevic, The Kafala Labor-Sponsorship 
System in the Gulf States, HUM. TRAFFICKING CTR. (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://humantraffickingcenter.org/the-kafala-labor-sponsorship-system-in-the-gulf-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/VZ3M-5SW3].  
 61. Adriana Kemp & Rebeca Raijman, Bringing in State Regulations, Private Brokers, and Local 
Employers: A Meso-Level Analysis of Labor Trafficking in Israel, 48 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 604,        
617–18 (2014). 
 62. Siobhán Mullally & Clíodhna Murphy, Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK: Enacting 
Exclusions, Exemptions, and Rights, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 397, 411, 413 (2014). 
 63. KALAYAAN, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE TIED MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKER VISA 
(2013), http://www.kalayaan.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Slavery-by-a-new-name-Briefing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/74CD-HUMQ]. Kalayaan, a London-based domestic workers’ rights organization, 
reported that after introduction of employer-tying, there was a significant increase in numbers of domestic 
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Although the GCM suggests States undertake targeted action in all 
of these areas, as the above shows, ensuring that States actually do so 
will require overcoming significant resistance by States and by 
powerful nonstate actors to whom States have long outsourced labor 
migration governance. The goal of improving migrant worker welfare 
will inevitably be weighed against the competing concerns of 
facilitating access to foreign labor markets and maintaining border 
control. As secretariat and coordinator of U.N. efforts to assist States 
with GCM implementation, the IOM is well-positioned to influence 
state actions on such matters. But determining how the IOM might 
weigh the competing concerns requires a closer look at the IOM’s 
operational history and structure. 
II.   The IOM and “Migration Management” 
Before becoming a U.N.-related organization in 2016, the IOM 
existed largely on the periphery of the international system. Despite its 
extensive operations on the ground, the IOM has rarely been examined 
in academic literature, in part due to misperceptions of its historical 
insignificance as a glorified travel agency and also its opacity as an 
institution.64 Its newly elevated status, however, put a spotlight on the 
organization, illuminating two aspects of the IOM’s structure and 
operational history that raise concerns over the human rights and labor 
rights implications of the IOM’s new role. The first is the IOM’s 
checkered history of operations that have both advanced but also 
severely constrained—if not violated—the rights of migrants. The 
second is the IOM’s status as a related organization rather than a U.N. 
specialized agency.65 Contrary to what one might assume from the 
IOM’s self-description as “U.N. Migration,” the IOM operates 
independently of the United Nations. Moreover, the IOM does not 
                                                                                                             
workers who experienced decreased pay or no pay at all, confinement in the home, passport confiscation, 
and psychological abuse. Id.  
 64. See generally Antoine Pécoud, What Do We Know About the International Organization for 
Migration?, 44 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1621 (2017).  
 65. Press Release, IOM Becomes a Related Organization to the U.N., Int’l Org. Migration (July 25, 
2016), https://www.iom.int/news/iom-becomes-related-organization-un [https://perma.cc/Y46M-JQ7W].  
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have a normative protection mandate, unlike U.N. specialized agencies 
also dealing with migrant populations, such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO).66 Given the IOM’s 
operational history and its non-normative mandate, whether the IOM 
would prioritize migrant welfare in advising States on GCM 
implementation is far from certain. 
A.   The IOM’s Operational History 
Founded in 1951, the IOM has grown from a small, 
intergovernmental body of sixteen Member States to an organization 
of 173 Member States (and a further eight States with observer 
status).67 As a non-normative organization, the IOM is not required to 
engage in rights-based governance. Its constitution simply establishes 
that the IOM is to provide migration services to its Member States and 
that in carrying out its functions, the IOM is to cooperate with other 
entities concerned with migration and to recognize the primacy of 
national law.68 To implement this mandate, the IOM maintains a small 
headquarters office in Geneva, while its approximately 10,000 
employees primarily staff the IOM’s 500 field offices and duty stations 
located in over 100 countries.69 The IOM works in four areas of 
migration management: migration and development, facilitating 
migration, regulating migration, and addressing forced migration.70 Its 
diverse activities have included, for example, refugee resettlement, 
repatriation of trafficked persons and unsuccessful asylum seekers, 
                                                                                                             
 66. NICHOLAS R. MICINSKI & THOMAS G. WEISS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION 
AND THE U.N. SYSTEM: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY, FUTURE U.N. DEV. SYS. 3 (2016).  
 67. About IOM, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION, https://www.iom.int/about-iom [https://perma.cc/693V-
DWBH] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter About IOM]. 
 68. Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 1, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION https://www.iom.int/constitution 
[https://perma.cc/3855-BVDX] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter IOM Constitution]. 
 69. Megan Bradley, The International Organization for Migration (IOM): Gaining Power in the 
Forced Migration Regime, REFUGE, Mar. 23, 2017, at 97, 101; About IOM, supra note 67. 
 70. U.N. Migration, Our Work, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION, https://www.iom.int/our-work 
[https://perma.cc/4RBG-4SKR] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
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labor recruitment, certification of third-party labor recruiters, and 
implementation of immigrant detention programs, among others.71 
This wide range of activities is at least partly attributable to the 
IOM’s funding model. Unlike U.N. specialized agencies, the IOM 
does not have a regular budget that funds its operations.72 Article 20 
of the IOM Constitution provides that cash contributions from 
Member States will fund the IOM’s administrative budget, while its 
operational budget will be funded through voluntary contributions 
provided in exchange for the IOM’s migration services.73 The IOM’s 
operational funding thus relies on projectization or activity-based 
costing such that the IOM offices and staff depend on the acquisition 
of projects for survival. As Dr. Fabian Georgi explains, projectization 
“creates an instrumental-rational logic that establishes the monetary 
value of a project as an independent and important factor in addition 
to its practical use-value or its normative justification.”74 
Projectization combined with the IOM’s decentralized structure results 
in the IOM operating like a private company or a “bureaucratic 
entrepreneur” whose first priority is survival.75 This funding structure 
has created the perception that the “IOM as an agency will do anything 
as long as there’s money with which to do it.”76 The IOM’s heavy 
reliance on projects for mostly western governments of industrialized 
countries—which have come to rely on the IOM for its “jack of all 
trades” flexibility and its logistical efficiency in project delivery—has 
fed the perception that the IOM is an “instrument of Northern foreign 
policy.”77 
The IOM’s funding structure and its lack of a normative mandate 
have fostered the perception that the IOM is a “deeply ambivalent 
                                                                                                             
 71. About IOM, supra note 67. 
 72. IOM Constitution, supra note 68, at ch. 7, art. 20. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Fabian Georgi, For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration and Its 
Global Migration Management, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT 45, 63 
(Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud eds., 2010). 
 75. Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud, International Organisations and the Politics of Migration, 40 
J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 865, 870 (2014). 
 76. Georgi, supra note 74. 
 77. Bradley, supra note 69, at 100, 103. 
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organization” that engages in diverse activities that are contradictory, 
if not controversial.78 The IOM claims a humanitarian 
mission—working “to help ensure the orderly and humane 
management of migration” and “to provide humanitarian assistance to 
migrants in need, including refugees and internally displaced 
people.”79 Yet, the IOM’s involvement in the “ordering of movement” 
has drawn criticism from human rights organizations for using 
coercive practices (such as immigrant detention and refugee 
repatriation) that arguably “constrain rather than advance the rights 
and well-being of migrants.”80 Indeed, the fact that the IOM receives 
funding to undertake activities that are clearly within the purview of 
normative agencies (for example, UNHCR) has prompted human 
rights organizations to question whether States might strategically 
fund the IOM to undertake these activities to avoid more rigorous 
application of human rights standards.81 
Regarding labor migration specifically, the IOM’s activities have 
reflected its entrepreneurial ethos and drawn concern regarding its 
normative commitment to migrant worker welfare. The IOM directly 
participated in labor recruitment in at least two pilot programs: 
working closely with governments to recruit Thai agricultural workers 
for work in Israel and to recruit Guatemalan agricultural workers for 
work in Quebec.82 Both programs were mired in controversy. The 
IOM’s involvement apparently did not curtail the rampant human 
rights abuses suffered by the Thai migrant workers—including 122 
                                                                                                             
 78. Georgi, supra note 74, at 47. 
 79. About IOM, supra note 67. 
 80. Bradley, supra note 77, at 99; Amnesty Int’l, Statement by Amnesty International & Human Rights 
Watch to the Governing Council, International Organization for Migration, AI Index: IOR 42/006/2002 
(Dec. 2–4, 2002). 
 81. Ishan Ashutosh & Alison Mountz, Migration Management for the Benefit of Whom? Interrogating 
the Work of the International Organization for Migration, 15 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 21, 22 (2011); Human 
Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch’s Statement to the IOM Governing Council 29 Nov. – 2 Dec. 2005 
(90th Session), https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/ 
mainsite/about_iom/en/council/90/Human%20Rights%20Watch.pdf [https://perma.cc/AWD2-YCPL]. 
 82. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A RAW DEAL: ABUSES OF THAI WORKERS IN ISRAEL’S AGRICULTURAL 
SECTOR 16 (2015); Giselle Valarezo, Offloading Migration Management: The Institutionalized Authority 
of Non-State Agencies over the Guatemalan Temporary Agricultural Worker to Canada Project, 16 J. 
INT’L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 661, 667 (2015). 
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deaths—detailed in a Human Rights Watch investigative report.83 As 
to the Guatemala–Quebec program, the IOM essentially created a 
transnational labor migration corridor that ultimately rendered 
Guatemalan migrant workers “extremely vulnerable to manipulation 
and abuse.”84 The workers were allegedly mistreated not only by IOM 
personnel directly but also by unscrupulous labor recruiters who 
emerged after the IOM was forced to end its involvement in the 
program, in the wake of corruption scandals involving the Director of 
the IOM-Guatemala office.85 
B.   The IOM’s Non-Normative Mandate 
After several decades operating independently of the U.N. system, 
in 2016, the IOM chose to become a U.N. “related organization”—a 
status held by only two other institutions: the World Trade 
Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency.86 The IOM 
could have opted to become a U.N. specialized agency. In that 
capacity, the IOM would have been brought within the general 
accountability mechanisms of the U.N., bound by the U.N. Charter’s 
requirement of impartiality, and expected to operate in line with the 
normative protective mandates of other U.N. agencies.87 Choosing 
instead to become a U.N. related organization enabled the IOM to 
maintain its independence. As stated in the U.N.–IOM Agreement 
establishing the relationship, the IOM “by virtue of its Constitution, 
shall function as an independent, autonomous[,] and non-normative 
                                                                                                             
 83. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 82, at 41. 
 84. Catherine Gabriel & Laura Macdonald, After the International Organization for Migration: 
Recruitment of Guatemalan Temporary Agricultural Workers to Canada, 44 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION 
STUD. 1706, 1720 (2018). 
 85. Valarezo, supra note 82, at 671–72. 
 86. Related Organizations, U.N. SYSTEM, https://www.unsystem.org/members/related-organizations 
[https://perma.cc/94DH-KF93] (last visited Mar. 24, 2020). 
 87. Miriam Cullen, The IOM’s New Status and Its Role Under the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
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international organization in the working relationship with the United 
Nations.”88 
Notwithstanding its refusal to become a U.N. specialized agency, 
the IOM quickly rebranded itself on its website as “U.N. 
Migration”—a move interpreted by some as an effort to establish equal 
position as the UNHCR, also known as “The U.N. Refugee Agency.”89 
The IOM quietly assumed the role of lead migration agency not only 
in name but also in practice, as the U.N. transferred to the IOM 
increasing responsibility for migration issues that would otherwise 
have been handled by the U.N. Secretariat or a U.N. specialized 
agency.90 It therefore came as little surprise that the GCM would 
ultimately designate the IOM to serve as “the coordinator and 
secretariat” of a U.N. network on migration, established “to 
ensure . . . coherent system-wide support” to GCM implementation, 
including its “capacity-building mechanism.”91 Assigning the IOM 
this responsibility was controversial, as it bypassed a number of U.N. 
specialized agencies that address labor migration-related issues within 
their portfolios and under rights-protective mandates (for example, the 
ILO, OHCHR, and UNHCR).92 Tellingly, the U.N. Secretary-General, 
in a report providing input on the first draft of the GCM, noted that 
strengthening the international community’s work on migration issues 
would best be “achieved if, in time, [the] IOM [was] brought more 
fully into the United Nations system as a specialized agency, properly 
equipped for that role.”93 
Contrary to the U.N. Secretary-General’s expressed hope, however, 
the IOM remains decidedly non-normative and independent of the 
United Nations. As the IOM Director General António Vitorino 
                                                                                                             
 88. UN-IOM Agreement, supra note 19 (emphasis added). 
 89. Martin Geiger & Martin Koch, World Organization in Migration Politics: The International 
Organization for Migration, J. INT’L ORG. STUD., Spring 2018, at 25, 32; About IOM, supra note 67; U.N. 
REFUGEE AGENCY, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ [https://perma.cc/5VDD-VCFG] (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020). 
 90. Cullen, supra note 87. 
 91. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 45. 
 92. Cullen, supra note 87. 
 93. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 37.  
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remarked at a March 2019 event, in response to a direct question 
regarding whether the IOM would promote a rights-based agenda: 
[I]n the migration field, we do not have an equivalent 
normative source that other agencies can build on, like 
UNHCR, for instance [with the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol], or like ILO who has the Convention 
on the Rights of Migrant Workers, in spite of fact that it’s 
not widely [ratified]. In the migration policy field, there is 
no equivalent normative base, so everything will depend 
much more on cooperation, international cooperation of 
IOM member states, and international organizations and 
member states. That’s the key issue. Life is what it is. And 
definitely if you see what has happened with the Global 
Compact—it’s quite clear that there are no conditions for 
speaking of a normative role equivalent to the ones of other 
agencies.94 
Yet, as scholars have noted, although the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families (U.N. Migrant Workers Convention) is poorly ratified,95 
many of its provisions echo rights guarantees contained in widely 
ratified international human rights treaties.96 Moreover, the GCM’s 
preambular language explicitly states that the GCM rests on 
international human rights treaties and the ILO conventions on 
promoting decent work and labor migration, among other treaties.97 
Hence, whether contained in international treaties or in the GCM itself, 
                                                                                                             
 94. A Conversation with António Vitorino, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/events/conversation-director-general-international-organization-
migration [https://perma.cc/2YZ2-RWC3]. 
 95. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS., 
https://indicators.ohchr.org [https://perma.cc/J4VW-33N8] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (indicating 
fifty-five ratifying States). 
 96. Ryszard Cholewinski, The Rights of Migrant Workers, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 255 
(Ryszard Cholewinski et al. eds., 2007). 
 97. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 2. 
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there is a normative base from which the IOM could draw if it chose 
to pursue a rights-based agenda. 
III.   Migrant Workers’ Rights vs. “Migration as Development” 
Close examination of global labor migration dynamics and the 
diverse roles the IOM has assumed in migration management 
underscore why its lack of a normative protection mandate matters. 
Global labor migration is marked by normative and governance gaps, 
particularly concerning transnational labor recruitment practices. 
Though States remain key players in labor migration, strategic 
nonstate actors have also assumed prominent roles. Governments have 
increasingly outsourced cross-border labor migration management—a 
“de-responsibilization” of state agencies for labor migrants’ rights and 
conditions98—to these largely unregulated actors.99 In doing so, they 
have fostered the creation of a highly competitive recruitment industry 
that tends to prioritize private profit interests over migrant welfare.100 
That countries of origin and countries of destination view these 
migration pathways as mutually beneficial disincentivizes close 
scrutiny of the myriad ways that labor migration structures render 
migrants vulnerable to exploitation. Even where States attempt to 
minimize the risks migrants face, power imbalances between 
States—and between migrants differently situated within racialized 
and gendered labor markets, on the one hand, and the various actors 
who profit from the migration industry, on the other101—can readily 
undermine such efforts. 
Given these background dynamics, a rights-based approach is 
critical to ensuring meaningful protection of migrant workers. 
Otherwise, the balance of interests underlying the GCM could readily 
tilt in favor of perpetuating the status quo, prioritizing interests in 
border control or labor market access over migrants’ rights protections. 
                                                                                                             
 98. Kemp & Raijman, supra note 61, at 608. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Valarezo, supra note 82, at 674. 
 101. Pauline Gardiner Barber & Catherine Bryan, International Organization for Migration in the 
Field: ‘Walking the Talk’ of Global Migration Management in Manila, 44 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 
1725, 1726 (2018). 
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The antitrafficking field is already showing indications of a softening 
of rights standards, for example, concerning efforts to address 
trafficking in labor supply chains, where proposed interventions have 
arguably diverted focus away from state responsibility and towards 
corporate social responsibility. Rather than putting sustained pressure 
on States to adopt laws and regulations to strengthen labor protections 
and accountability mechanisms, pressuring businesses to adopt 
voluntary standards and codes of conduct has become an increasingly 
dominant rubric in antitrafficking advocacy. 
As lead migration agency under the GCM, the IOM could be 
well-positioned to reinvigorate and promote a rights-based approach 
to labor migration governance. Although the IOM’s past involvement 
in creating (and perhaps profiting from) new transnational labor 
streams has raised rights concerns, the IOM recently has made a 
concerted effort to promote ethical recruitment standards. Upholding 
those standards will require, however, the IOM to navigate growing 
pressures from development institutions to permit rights tradeoffs for 
the sake of increasing labor mobility. 
 
A.   A Rights-Based Approach 
 
The GCM empowers the IOM is to oversee a “capacity-building 
mechanism,” to which Member States, the U.N., and other relevant 
stakeholders, including the private sector and philanthropic 
foundations, are invited to contribute resources.102 The mechanism 
includes a “connection hub that facilitates demand-driven, 
tailor-made[,] and integrated solutions”; a “start-up fund for initial 
financing to realize project-oriented solutions”; and a “global 
knowledge platform as an online open data source.”103 This, in effect, 
assigns the IOM the familiar role of collector and gatekeeper of ideas, 
through which it can identify, articulate, and disseminate rights 
standards. In its extensive operations on the ground, the IOM often 
                                                                                                             
 102. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 39. 
 103. Id. ¶ 43. 
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serves as a hub for policy discussion and debate, integrating a wide 
range of state and nonstate actors to incite them to think and act in 
similar ways.104 These interactions have enabled the IOM to shape 
perceptions of migration. As Professor Pécoud explains, the IOM 
makes sense of local migration realities by translating them into 
international migration narratives while also translating these 
narratives into local expertise via training, capacity-building, and 
cooperating with local stakeholders.105  
The choice of perspectives with which the IOM might engage in 
developing the GCM’s capacity-building mechanism can 
predetermine whether the mechanism produces knowledge that 
advances rights standards. The IOM’s work on labor migration issues, 
past and present, suggests contradictory impulses, however, as to 
whether or to what extent the IOM embraces a rights-based approach.  
On the one hand, the IOM’s past operations have focused on 
controlling and facilitating migration. Its migration management 
approach could be viewed as an attempt to overcome the tension 
between protectionist border control and the economic need for a 
flexible migrant workforce. After all, full control of borders is not only 
impossible but potentially counterproductive because it would 
undermine the necessary circulation of workers in the globalizing 
economy.106 The IOM’s migration approach thus aims to sort good 
from bad migration—the orderly and regular from the disorderly and 
irregular—such that migration can thereby be “for the benefit of 
all.”107 But as Professors Barber and Bryan observe, the IOM’s 
policies have constructed “ideal migrants/immigrants as those serving 
economic rather than humanitarian interests.”108 
On the other hand, IOM’s recent efforts to establish its International 
Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS)—“a global initiative that is 
                                                                                                             
 104. Julia Brachet, Policing the Desert: The IOM in Libya Beyond War and Peace, 48 ANTIPODE 272, 
277 (2016) (emphasis added). 
 105. Pécoud, supra note 64, at 1633–34. 
 106.  Antoine Pécoud, Informing Migrants to Manage Migration?, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION MANAGEMENT 196 (Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud eds., 2012). 
 107. Pécoud, supra note 64, at 1627, 1630. 
 108. Barber & Bryan, supra note 101, at 1728. 
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designed to promote ethical international recruitment”109—suggest a 
possible effort to expand migrant workers’ rights. Collaborating with 
a coalition of government, private sector, and civil society actors, IOM 
has established a benchmark for ethical recruitment known as the IRIS 
Standard and is developing a voluntary certification scheme for ethical 
recruiters to “provide assurance of compliance with the IRIS 
Standard.”110 Granted, IRIS might be yet another product of the IOM’s 
keen entrepreneurial ability to identify an opportunity and to stake a 
claim to expertise and a governance role in a growth area. The 
substance of the IRIS Standard reflects, however, a commitment to 
promoting international human rights and labor standards. The IRIS 
Standard calls upon recruiters to respect all applicable laws related to 
labor recruitment as well as the core labor standards recognized in the 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
(prohibiting trafficking, forced labor, and child labor, discrimination, 
and upholding freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights).111 The IRIS Standard further enumerates specific principles: 
prohibiting recruitment fees and related costs to migrant workers, and 
ensuring respect for freedom of movement, transparency regarding 
terms and conditions of employment, confidentiality and data 
protection, and access to remedy.112 
These principles find support in the GCM, which includes a number 
of suggested actions that clearly prioritize humanitarian interests over 
economic ones. For example, the IRIS Standard’s prohibition on 
recruitment fees directly aligns with the terms of CGM Objective 6 
(fair and ethical recruitment and decent work).113 Whether and to what 
extent the IOM relies on the IRIS Standard in advising States on 
implementing GCM Objective 6 will test the IOM’s professed 
commitment to ethical labor recruitment. 
 
                                                                                                             
 109.  INT’L RECRUITMENT INTEGRITY SYS., https://iris.iom.int [https://perma.cc/6L9R-349Y] (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
 110. IRIS Standard, INT’L RECRUITMENT INTEGRITY SYS., https://iris.iom.int/iris-standard 
[https://perma.cc/MB7S-2K4D] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter IRIS Standard]. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  
 113. GCM, supra note 14, ¶¶ 16(6), 22(c) 
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B.   The Migration-Development Nexus 
 
Adopting a rights-based approach, however, will require the IOM to 
resist calls from development institutions to prioritize increased labor 
mobility even at the cost of certain migrant workers’ rights. The 
development field is currently in an “optimistic” period regarding the 
so-called “migration-development nexus”114—which views the 
remittances migrants send home as crucial tools for reducing poverty 
and promoting long-term economic growth.115 Proponents of this 
paradigm (MDN proponents) frame migration as a solution to 
development, and thus seek increased labor mobility—usually through 
proliferation of temporary migration (or guestworker) programs 
(TMPs). TMPs typically impose, however, rights restrictions on 
participating migrants—the lower the skill level, the greater the 
restrictions.116 
For MDN proponents, rights restrictions are an acceptable tradeoff 
for increased access to remittance-generating jobs in foreign labor 
markets. Not only can remittances “bank the unbanked” but they can 
also produce macroeconomic benefits such as increased foreign 
currency reserves, an improved national credit rating, and an expanded 
tax base.117 Migration also yields social remittances in the form of new 
ideas, values, skills, and practices that migrants gain while working 
                                                                                                             
 114. Professor Hein De Haas likened the debate over the relationship between migration and 
development to a pendulum, with optimism regarding the migration-development nexus in the 1950s and 
1960s, to pessimism in the 1970s and 1980s, towards more optimistic views in the 1990s and 2000s. See 
generally Hein De Haas, Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective, 44 INT’L MIGRATION 
REV. 227 (2010) [hereinafter De Haas, Migration and Development]. 
 115.  See Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud, Migration, Development and the ‘Migration and 
Development Nexus,’ 19 POPULATION, SPACE & PLACE 369 (2013); Hein De Haas, The Migration and 
Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Research and Policy, INT’L MIGRATION, June 2012, at 8 
[hereinafter De Haas, Pendulum]; Ruby Khan, Remittances; A Development Mantra or a Dutch Disease 
for a Developing Country, INT’L J. RES. ECON. & SOC. SCI., Oct. 2019, at 1; Kerry Preibisch et al., 
Pursuing the Capabilities Approach Within the Migration-Development Nexus, 42 J. ETHNIC & 
MIGRATION STUD. 2111 (2016). 
 116.  Martin Ruhs & Philip Martin, Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest Worker Programs, 42 
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 249, 251 (2008). 
 117.  SOLIDARITY CTR., IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES? PURSUING THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
WITHIN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION 7 (2014). 
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abroad and share with their communities upon their return home.118 
Migration offers a cost-effective, bottom-up solution that gives 
individuals and their communities direct access to funds and a greater 
role in promoting development in their country.119 This is a welcome 
alternative to top-down, state-centered macroeconomic solutions 
imposed and mediated by (sometimes corrupt) government 
bureaucracies.120  
The migration-development nexus has drawn its fair share of 
criticism, however, not the least of which is the lack of empirical 
evidence to support its claims to long-term development 
gains121—which, as it turns out, are highly context-dependent.122 
Moreover, as Professor Rosser explains, “countries ignore at their own 
peril the economic challenges inherent when an economy is injected 
with extra capital divorced from national production,” including 
inflation and increased inequality between families that receive 
remittances and those that do not.123 Indeed, reliance on remittance 
incomes can disincentivize local work and has actually fueled 
increased migration—especially as young people who have grown up 
in households reliant on remittance income now themselves seek 
higher-paying jobs abroad.124 This exacerbates the problems of brain 
and brawn drain, which reduce the talent and energy required to pursue 
the political and economic reforms necessary for meaningful structural 
development. Indeed, critics argue, the migration-development 
paradigm overlooks features of the global political economy that drive 
people to migrate—for example, growing inequality between countries 
and within communities, development failures, and poor 
                                                                                                             
 118.  Id. at 9. 
 119.  Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 371; Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
3, 52 (2008). 
 120.  SOLIDARITY CTR., supra note 117; Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 371; Rosser, supra note 
119. 
 121.  Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 379; De Haas, Migration and Development, supra note 114, 
at 236, 242–43.  
 122.  De Haas, Pendulum, supra note 115, at 256. 
 123.  Rosser, supra note 119, at 21–22. 
 124.  Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 370. 
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governance.125  It thus absolves States of their responsibility to pursue 
necessary reforms to address these causal factors and instead shifts the 
burden to migrants to engage in “self-help” development.126 Reflecting 
the paradigm’s neoliberal underpinnings, migrants and 
markets—instead of States—thus become responsible for bringing 
about development.127  
These criticisms notwithstanding, development actors have pressed 
for establishing more temporary migration programs worldwide to 
unleash the full potential of development gains to be had from 
remittance-producing migration. Take, for example, the new 
organization, Labor Mobility Partnerships (LaMP), launched by the 
Center for Global Development, a prominent think tank working to 
alleviate poverty.128 LaMP “aims to be the first organization which 
actively works to increase rights-respecting labor migration, with a 
long-term goal of unlocking billions in income gains from people 
filling needed jobs.”129 LaMP shares the IOM’s “triple win” view of 
migration—namely, that with productive policies in place, an increase 
in migration can create new opportunities and benefits for host 
countries, origin countries, and migrants.130 Consequently, LaMP 
argues that rather than restricting migration (as most destination 
countries are inclined to do), governments should instead develop laws 
and policies to maximize the benefits of migration.131 
                                                                                                             
 125.  De Haas, Migration and Development, supra note 114, at 236; Preibisch et al., supra note 115, at 
2115–16. 
 126.  Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 371; De Haas, Migration and Development, supra note 114, 
at 234, 236. 
 127.  De Haas, Migration and Development, supra note 114, at 236, 245–46; Rosser, supra note 119, at 
51–52. 
 128. Labor Mobility Partnerships (LaMP): Helping Connect International Labor Markets, CTR. GLOB 
DEV., https://www.cgdev.org/page/labor-mobility-partnerships-lamp-helping-connect-international-
labor-markets [https://perma.cc/RQ3Y-95ZJ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter Labor Mobility 
Partnerships (LaMP)]. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Host countries can benefit from higher incomes and employment rates for native workers, 
increased innovation, and net positive fiscal effects. Migrants and their origin countries can benefit from 
higher incomes for migrants’ families back home through remittances, which in turn can create other 
positive effects such as improved education and nutrition outcomes. Origin countries, furthermore, can 
benefit from knowledge and technology transfers that diversify and benefit the economy. MICHAEL 
CLEMENS ET AL., MIGRATION IS WHAT YOU MAKE IT: SEVEN POLICY DECISIONS THAT TURNED 
CHALLENGES INTO OPPORTUNITIES, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV. 2 (2018). 
 131. Id. 
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Although rights advocates would agree that labor migration could 
pose a triple win under certain conditions, the perspective LaMP 
articulates below offers a major point of disagreement: 
If more legal channels for labor mobility were opened, the 
incomes of developing country citizens could increase 
fourfold while global GDP could as much as double. These 
potential gains make labor mobility one of the most powerful 
tools for poverty alleviation currently on the current 
development agenda. 
Despite this fact, the international community provides 
little support to migrant sending and receiving countries 
struggling to connect potential migrants (who need jobs) to 
potential employers (who need workers). The available 
support often promotes international standards which may 
have little to do with local circumstances and needs. 
This leaves many countries with critical unanswered 
demand for support in an era when labor mobility is 
increasing and desperately needed.132  
In other words, adherence to international rights standards is a 
problematic barrier to labor mobility. This perspective invokes the 
“numbers versus rights” debate in migration policy.133 As Professors 
Ruhs and Martin explain, as an empirical matter, “there is a trade-off, 
i.e., an inverse relationship between the number and rights of migrants 
employed in low-skilled jobs in high-income countries.”134 Increasing 
migrant numbers comes at the sacrifice of migrants’ rights. The 
questions of whether and how to accept such conditions as a matter of 
migration policy are deeply divisive, and the responses reflect 
fundamentally divergent perspectives on migrant workers.135  
                                                                                                             
 132. Labor Mobility Partnerships (LaMP), supra note 128 (emphasis added). 
 133.  See generally MARTIN RUHS, THE PRICE OF RIGHTS (2013); Ruhs & Martin, supra note 116. 
 134.  Ruhs & Martin, supra note 116. 
 135.  Compare RUHS, supra note 133, 154–86 (proposing a set of rights tradeoffs), with Preibisch et al., 
supra note 115, at 2120–23 (criticizing the policy focus on the “rights versus numbers” debate). 
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On the one hand are those (including human rights and labor 
advocates) who view migrant workers as, in a sense, victims of broader 
forces that push and pull them over national boundaries (e.g., 
inequality, climate change). As such, migrant workers are deserving of 
special rights protections, especially considering the significant 
economic and social costs of migration that migrants and their families 
must endure (e.g., the psychological impact of family separation). For 
migrants’ rights advocates, the willingness to sacrifice migrants’ rights 
in pursuit of uncertain economic gains signifies a disturbingly thin 
view of development that fails to appreciate the importance of 
expanding human capabilities as a measure of development 
progress.136  On the other hand, are those (including MDN proponents) 
who perceive migrant workers as rational economic actors who 
can—and do—willingly assume rights tradeoffs to gain access to jobs 
abroad.137 Hence, accepting rights tradeoffs is a pragmatic choice that 
also honors migrants’ decisions to become “agents of development.”  
Adopting the latter view, LaMP’s policy prescriptions focus on the 
question of which rights to afford or deny to migrant workers to 
maximize labor mobility and harness the development gains from 
remittances. LaMP has argued, for example, against a prohibition on 
recruitment fees (or “zero-fee recruitment”)—a position contrary to 
the IRIS Standards, the GCM’s suggested measures, and the 
preference of rights advocates.138 According to LaMP, zero-fee 
recruitment (1) ignores migrants’ willingness to pay recruitment fees 
as an “investment” that can yield “vast gains”; (2) ignores the fact that 
there are real costs associated with recruitment services; and (3) relies 
solely on governments’ ability to regulate and enforce transactions 
over which, in practice, they exert little control.139 LaMP 
acknowledges that migrants take on debt to pay (often exorbitant) 
recruitment fees, providing recruiters (and employers) leverage to 
                                                                                                             
 136.   Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 372; Preibisch et al., supra note 115, at 2112.  
 137.  RUHS, supra note 133, at 39–52; Ruhs & Martin, supra note 116, at 259. 
 138.  Rebekah Smith & Richard Johnson, Introducing an Outcomes-Based Migrant Welfare Fund, 
LAMP F.: BLOG (Jan. 16, 2020), https://lampforum.org/2020/01/16/introducing-an-outcomes-based-
migrant-welfare-fund/ [https://perma.cc/2US5-MA5S]. 
 139. Id. 
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engage in abusive practices. But instead of prohibiting recruitment 
fees, LaMP proposes creating an “outcomes-based migrant welfare 
fund” that would fund recruitment of workers as well as “the necessary 
government institutions for protections and oversight.”140 The fund 
would begin with an infusion of funds from social investors, but 
eventually become self-financing through contributions from the 
migrant workers, who pay a percentage of their salary to the fund if 
they “successfully find and sustain quality employment.”141 The 
recruiters would have “outcomes-based contracts,” with payments for 
their services contingent on the quantity and quality of jobs they secure 
for workers. LaMP argues that this is a better model than zero-fees 
recruitment because it aligns the incentives of workers, employers, and 
governments using outcome-based contracting.  
From a rights perspective, LaMP’s proposal perhaps has surface 
appeal for attempting to disincentivize recruitment abuse by making 
payment of recruitment fees contingent on satisfactory outcomes. But 
the proposal raises too many questions to inspire confidence in its 
workability. Who determines, and by what standards, whether an 
outcome is satisfactory? Are there protections against unsatisfied 
workers from being blacklisted by future recruiters? The realities of 
how unequal bargaining power between employer/recruiter and 
migrant worker manifests invites skepticism towards any proposal that 
does not meaningfully protect workers’ power to demand better 
working conditions. 
But even beyond issues of practical application, LaMP’s proposal 
contradicts a core principle of ethical recruitment frameworks such as 
that embraced by IRIS: that no worker should have to pay for a job. 
Under the “Employers Pay” principle that IRIS promotes, the costs of 
recruitment should instead be borne by employers.142 Not only do 
employers benefit from access to flexible and affordable labor markets 
                                                                                                             
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142.  Fair for Employers, INT’L RECRUITMENT INTEGRITY SYS., https://iris.iom.int/fair-employers 
[https://perma.cc/PAZ6-VH83] (last visited May 18, 2020) (discussing the “Employer Pays” principle); 
IRIS Standard, supra note 110 (Prohibition of Recruitment Fees and Related Costs to Migrant Workers). 
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but they are better positioned to cover recruitment costs. Moreover, the 
GCM explicitly recommends that States prohibit recruitment fees “in 
order to prevent debt bondage, exploitation and forced labor.”143 
Prohibiting recruitment fees is a crucial structural reform of 
cross-border labor recruitment practices that otherwise afford 
unscrupulous recruiters and employers leverage to maintain 
substandard if not abusive labor conditions. Rights tradeoffs in this 
context thus can only create and sustain migrants’ vulnerability to 
trafficking.  
In advising States on GCM implementation, the IOM could hold the 
line with respect to the rights tradeoffs proposed by LaMP and other 
adherents of the migration-development paradigm. While a 
rights-based approach to recruitment coincides with IOM’s own work 
promoting ethical recruitment through IRIS, recruitment is but one of 
a number of areas for which the IOM could tilt the balance of 
competing interests towards migrants’ rights protections. The GCM is 
rife with suggested actions for States to take to reduce vulnerability to 
exploitation and abuse—many, if not all, of which find normative 
grounding in international human rights and labor laws.   
CONCLUSION 
Given the strong State and nonstate actor interests in prioritizing the 
border control and improved labor market access aspects of the GCM 
over those pertaining to migrant welfare, the IOM might not naturally 
be inclined to promote a rights-based agenda on its own initiative. At 
the same time, however, the IOM’s work on the IRIS project suggests 
an opportunity for the IOM to become a standard-bearer in the field of 
international labor recruitment. In this and other areas, the IOM could 
elevate and promote the GCM’s provisions that seek to improve 
migrant welfare. After all, the GCM remains a potentially useful tool 
for preventing trafficking on many other fronts. Eliminating 
employer-tying of visas and providing meaningful anti-retaliation 
                                                                                                             
 143.  GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 22(c) (under Objective 6: facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and 
safeguard conditions that ensure decent work). 
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protections, for example, would address significant structural 
contributors to the problem of human trafficking. These features of 
how global labor migration is currently structured are deeply 
embedded in the practices and policies of countries of destination and 
of origin. Realizing the GCM’s transformative potential will therefore 
require rights advocates to closely scrutinize and inform the IOM’s 
efforts to guide States’ implementation of the GCM. Doing so with an 
eye to ensuring that States incorporate these and other worker 
protections could meaningfully advance overdue efforts to prevent 
human trafficking in the long term. 
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